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NOTE
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: LOCATION TRACKING ON
FACEBOOK, TWITTER, AND FOURSQUARE
Lisa A. Schmidt*
In the 2012 case United States v. Jones, Justice Samuel Alito asked
whether the Fourth Amendment might extend any protection to new tech-
nology. Although the government may not track an individual through
the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) services, the Supreme
Court's past cases suggest that the same protection will not extend to
new technologies like social networking. Popular social networking
websites Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare allow users to keep others
aware of their location at all times, leading to the question of whether
the government may track a user's location through social networking
use. The author argues that past Fourth Amendment case law warns
social networking users that the government may track location through
tags and check-ins, and Internet users may not have the standing to raise
a privacy claim for such tracking. The author concludes that Internet
users must maintain their own privacy because the government may use
any public information to track their locations.
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INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND PRIVACY'
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... ."2 Recent
Internet developments raise the question of whether this right extends to
social networking. Even Justice Alito recognized the issue in his United
States v. Jones concurrence, noting that social tools "will . . . shape the
average person's expectations about the privacy of his or her daily
movements." 3
In the social networking context, can law enforcement use a photo-
graph, check-in, or status update posted online to justify further search or
I The descriptions of social networking websites within this Note reflect the policies
and format of the websites at the time of writing. The privacy policies of social networking
websites are constantly evolving and may change at any time after the researching and writing
of this Note.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) ("Similarly, phone-location-tracking
services are offered as 'social' tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who
enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other new devices will continue
to shape the average person's expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.").
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even arrest? Under current Fourth Amendment case law, most notably
Katz v. United States,4 the answer seems to be yes. Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion in Katz v. United States has come to govern the standard
for what qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment.5 In short,
the Fourth Amendment applies in situations where an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 6 This standard cannot be satisfied in
social networking. From news stories to privacy controls and even to
user updates themselves, there may be no real protection from the author-
ities when one posts online.
This Note details applicable Fourth Amendment case law and con-
cludes that all social networking users should be wary of the information
they post online. Government officials may use public information to
justify an arrest or conviction, and without Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, users may be subject to criminal liability based on personal photo-
graphs, location check-ins, or status updates posted on social networking
websites.
The statistics on social networking are staggering. The most popu-
lar social networking website, Facebook, has become a worldwide phe-
nomenon. 7 Facebook allows users to share photos, status updates, their
location, and other media with their "friends." 8 Facebook alone has
more than one billion users, and the average Facebook user shares ninety
pieces of information each month. 9 Facebook sees over one million pho-
tographs uploaded every twenty minutes.' 0 Additionally, more than six
hundred million active users access Facebook through an application on
their mobile phone, and many of these users stay logged into Facebook
for extended periods of time, with the mobile phone application tracking
their location." Facebook states that it has seen over seventeen billion
location-tagged posts, including check-ins to the user's current
location. 12
Twitter is a social networking website that allows users to share
small status updates (under 140 characters) and photos with their "fol-
4 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
5 See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
6 See id.
7 See generally Dan Fletcher, How Facebook Is Redefining Privacy, TIME (May 20,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798,00.html.
8 See id.
9 See One Billion Fact Sheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/imagelibrary/
downloadmedia.ashx?MediaDetailslD=4227&Sizeld=-1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2012); Adam
Ostrow, What happens after your final status update? CNN (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.cnn.
corn/201 I/OPINION/09/03/ostrow.status.final/index.html.
10 Aden Hepburn, Facebook Statistics, Stats & Facts for 2011, DIGIfAL. BuzZ BiLOG (Jan.
18, 2011), http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/facebook-statistics-stats-facts-201 1/.
1 See One Billion Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
12 Id.
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lowers."' 3 Twitter status updates sometimes reflect the users' random
thoughts, but users also post their locations or photos in their "tweets."l 4
Twitter has over 100 million active users worldwide, and the website
manages an average of 230 million tweets everyday.15 While half of
those 100 million users log into Twitter daily, some 40% of users do not
share updates of their own, but instead merely view the tweets posted by
others.16
Finally, Foursquare, a relatively new social networking platform, al-
lows users to "check-in" to locations, providing real-time updates of the
users' locations.' 7 Foursquare currently has over 10 million users.' 8
Foursquare is also accessible through a mobile phone application, al-
lowing instantaneous sharing of information, but many users fail to con-
sider the public exposure of their whereabouts. 19
With so many social networking website users, there is a need to
protect the information placed on those websites. For example, what
happens to users who do not properly manage their use of these web-
sites? Is there any protection against the police using that information, in
the form of photos, check-ins, or tags, to justify a search or even an
arrest? Do users face police action based on their online postings? The
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the Fourth Amendment's relation-
ship with social networking, but as technology continues to advance and
as Justice Alito noted in United States v. Jones,20 the Court will have to
examine these issues soon.
This Note focuses on the privacy implications of social networking
activity in the context of location tracking. Facebook, Twitter, and Four-
square are all capable of tracking users' locations while they are logged
into the website, and the Fourth Amendment may not apply to this type
of location tracking. This Note also discusses the Fourth Amendment
13 About Twitter, TwIrrfR, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
'4 Id.
15 Bianca Bosker, Twitter Finally Shares Key Stats: 40 Percent of Active Users Are
Lurkers, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 8, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
09/08/twitter-stats n_954121.htmi.
16 Id.
17 Bianca Bosker, Foursquare Celebrates 10 Million Users, Reveals New Stars, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 20, 2011, 6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/four-
square-10-million-users-stats n_880772.html.
18 Id.
19 See Some Notes on Foursquare and Location Sharing, FOURSQUARE LABS, INC., http://
blog.foursquare.com/2010/08/17/967910179/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
20 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting
that "phone-location-tracking services are offered as 'social' tools, allowing consumers to find
(or to avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other
new devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations about the privacy of his
or her daily movements.").
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case law detailing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard 2 1 and
concludes that any media placed on social networking websites-includ-
ing location check-ins-may be without Fourth Amendment protection,
because, in the words of the Katz opinion, the social networking users
knowingly exposed that information to the public. 2 2 Thus, Government
officials may use any information posted on these websites to justify an
arrest or as evidence in a case against a suspect. This Note details the
users' need to remain aware of publicly viewable information on social
networking websites, from photographs and status updates to location
check-ins.
Part I of this Note discusses the Katz reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy standard. Part II details Fourth Amendment doctrine in the context
of location tracking, including considerations of plain view movements
and the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) trackers. Part III dis-
cusses various implications of the Fourth Amendment in social network-
ing, including consent and "opting in" to the privacy rules of Facebook,
Twitter, and Foursquare. This Part also addresses recent developments
in several cases implicating Fourth Amendment protection in social
networking use. Part IV discusses some of the foremost Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment cases, specifically those involving new technology
and plain view surveillance. Part V focuses on the Supreme Court's de-
velopment of the "pretend friend" doctrine. Lastly, Part VI examines
additional considerations in a social networking search analysis, includ-
ing youth privacy and suppression claims.
I. KATZ v. UNITED STATES AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY TEST
The leading case governing Fourth Amendment searches remains
Katz v. United States.2 3 In Katz, Justice Harlan argued in his concur-
rence that Fourth Amendment violations must be decided under a reason-
able expectation of privacy standard. 2 4 In this case, the defendant used a
public pay phone to place illegal gambling wagers. 25 The FBI had at-
tached an electronic device to the phone booth to listen to Katz's call,
and the officers used the information that they gathered while listening to
the call to justify Katz's arrest and conviction. 26 Katz appealed his con-
viction, claiming that the use of the electronic device constituted a search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2 7 The Supreme Court agreed
21 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22 See id.
23 Id. at 359.
24 Id. at 360.
25 See id. at 348.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 350.
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with Katz, stating that the wiretapping constituted a search because it
violated Katz's reasonable expectation that his conversation would not
be broadcast to the world regardless of the lawfulness of Katz's
actions. 28
As the Katz Court stated, "Virtually every governmental action in-
terferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case
is whether that interference violates a command of the United States
Constitution." 29 The Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches
and seizures governs the inquiry.30 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stewart argued that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection."31
Because social networking websites are still in their infancy, the
Court has yet not narrowed the definition of "knowingly exposed" for
application to social networking website activity. However, these web-
sites have become one of the most common modes of communication,
and it seems inevitable that this issue will soon reach the Court. 32 Be-
cause of the privacy guidelines disclosed on each social networking web-
site, location check-ins may be considered knowingly exposed to the
public; to join a social network, the user must respond to the standard
privacy policy and accept the terms-of-use agreement. 33 A user may ar-
gue that her social networking use is not aimed toward the public dissem-
ination of personal information, but that user posts with the hope that the
community will see the information. A user posts with the understanding
that the information put on social networking websites will be broadcast
to the world and, thus, knowingly exposed. Therefore, under the Katz
framework, it seems that the average social networking website user will
not receive the benefit of the Fourth Amendment's protections for her
online social networking activity.
Under Katz, even if the information is knowingly exposed, what a
defendant "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." 34 In a public phone booth, for
example, an individual "is surely entitled to assume that the words he
28 Id. at 356-57.
29 Id. at 350 n. 5.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 351.
32 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting
that "phone-location-tracking services are offered as 'social' tools, allowing consumers to find
(or to avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availability and use of these and other
new devices will continue to shape the average person's expectations about the privacy of his
or her daily movements.").
33 See infra Part III.
34 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." 3 5 How-
ever, many users communicate via social networking precisely for the
purpose of broadcasting information to the world, or at least to the insu-
lar social world of their friend network.36 While some web users have
already suffered criminal sanctions for actions described in social
networking "brags," 37 even more users likely remain unaware of the le-
gal consequences of what they post online.
II. LOCATION TRACKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. United States v. Karo: Tracking Movement
Does the Fourth Amendment protect any form of location tracking?
The Supreme Court looked at this question in United States v. Karo.38 In
Karo, the police used a beeper to track the movement of a can of ether
inside the defendant's house. 39 The Court stated that the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and that, because the of-
ficers could not have seen what was happening inside the house, the
beeper gave the Government sensitive information from a constitution-
ally protected area.40 Because the Government obtained the information
through means beyond their own sensory perception, the use of the
beeper constituted a search.4 I However, the Court modified this doctrine
in United States v. Knotts.42
B. United States v. Knotts: Location Tracking in Plain View
Smith v. Maryland43 restated the following test for reasonableness
under Katz: "application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether
the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasona-
ble,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has been invaded by
government action."" Under this test, a court must answer two ques-
tions. First, it must consider "whether the individual, by his conduct, has
'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' "45 specifically,
35 Id. at 352.
36 See generally Social Networking's Good and Bad Impacts on Kids, AM. PsYcHOI OGI-
CAI, Assoc. (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/08/social-kids.aspx
(noting teenagers' narcissistic tendencies in Facebook posting).
37 See, e.g., Kelly Burgess, Facebook Bragging About Poaching Leads to Charges
Against Man, L.A. TIMus (May 27, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://Iatimesblogs.latimes.com/out-
posts/2011/05/facebook-bragging-leads-to-felony-poaching-arrest.html.
38 478 U.S. 705, 707 (1984).
39 Id. at 707.
40 Id. at 715.
41 Id.
42 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
43 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
44 Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
45 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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if "'he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' "46 Second, that court
must consider "whether the individual's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 4 7
Specifically, was the expectation justifiable "under the circumstances"? 48
In United States v. Knotts,49 Government officials tracked the
movement of the defendant's car using a beeper device placed inside a
container of chloroform.50 The car carrying the container travelled on
"public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents [were] in
plain view."5 The Court rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment
claim, holding that no search had taken place because anyone could have
seen the car's public movements, so the use of the beeper was therefore
irrelevant. 52 The Court held that if the car was in public view, there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy.5 3 Accordingly, "[n]othing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology." 54 In other words, the Court was prepared to endorse a
plain view exception5 5 to the search and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, a concept that can easily extend to information dis-
played online, from locations such as in Knotts to photographs detailing
criminal actions.
C. United States v. Jones: The Fourth Amendment and GPS Tracking
In the 2012 case United States v. Jones,56 the Supreme Court held
that the use of a GPS tracker to monitor a car's movement constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.57 In Jones, District of Columbia
police suspected the defendant of trafficking drugs and hoped to obtain
information about Jones's whereabouts to determine his role in a conspir-
acy to possess and distribute cocaine.58 Officers attached a GPS tracker
46 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
47 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
48 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n. 5).
49 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
52 Id. at 285.
53 Id. at 281.
54 Id at 282.
55 Under the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment, officers may seize evidence
found in plain view if they are engaged in legitimate police activity. See Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990). Similarly, if an officer hopes to obtain a warrant, his observations
of plain view evidence may provide the basis for probable cause to search. See Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1925).
56 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
57 See id. at 951-52.
58 See id. at 948. The District of Columbia police obtained a warrant to attach a GPS
tracker to Jones's car, but the tracker was attached in Maryland rather than the District of
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to Jones's car and received more than 2,000 pages of data from the
tracker that ultimately placed Jones at the conspirators' "stash house,"
which contained $850,000 in cash, ninety-seven kilograms of cocaine,
and one kilogram of cocaine base.59 The Government argued that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his plain view
movement under Knotts, and, therefore, the tracking did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.60 The Court, however, held that the use of a GPS
tracker to track a car's movement was a search under the Fourth
Amendment.6'
Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion emphasized the physical in-
trusion into Jones's property, 62 while Justice Alito concurred under the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.63 Justice Alito specifically
noted the growing use of tracking through mobile devices, stating that
tracking through "'social' tools" on phones can shape expectations of
privacy. 64 While the Government may not attach a GPS tracker to one's
"effects" under the Fourth Amendment, Jones likely does not preclude
tracking movement through social networking websites. First, the Jones
Court partly rested its holding on the physical intrusion into private prop-
erty. 6 5 If police choose to track an individual's movement through social
networking website activity, a court could reasonably conclude that there
is no physical intrusion because the movement information is publicly
available. Second, social networking activity may not be private prop-
erty, in part because the user opts in to using the website and accepts the
privacy agreements imposed by the social networking company. 6 6
However, the Court noted that physical intrusion is not the only
relevant inquiry; rather, the Fourth Amendment commands a combina-
tion of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test with a "common-
law trespassory test." 6 7 Social networking tracking would likely pass
both parts of this test because, here, there is neither a reasonable expecta-
Columbia. Thus, the Government was forced to concede that it did not comply with the war-
rant but argued that no warrant was required under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
59 Id. at 948-49.
60 See id. at 950.
61 Id. at 951-52.
62 See id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
63 See id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
64 See id. at 963 ("Similarly, phone-location-tracking services are offered as 'social'
tools, allowing consumers to find (or to avoid) others who enroll in these services. The availa-
bility and use of these and other new devices will continue to shape the average person's
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.").
65 See id. at 949.
66 See discussion on privacy policy, infra Part III, noting that social networking compa-
nies gain control over information posted on their websites.
67 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 ("[A]s we have discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.") (empha-
sis in original).
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tion of privacy under Katz, nor is there physical trespass. Additionally,
the inquiry could turn on the Internet's status as a "protected area" under
the Fourth Amendment. 68 While it is only one part of a Fourth Amend-
ment test, and it may not decide Fourth Amendment reasonableness, a
court could conclude that social networking websites are not protected
areas, and, thus, a user has no reasonable expectation of privacy.
111. SOCIAL NETWORKING AND FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
A. Social Networking and Consent
As discussed in Part I supra, the average social networking website
user may have no real expectation of privacy regarding the information
that she shares on social networking websites. There is, however, an-
other consideration in the Fourth Amendment context. Even if the Court
were to hold that social networking websites are subject to Fourth
Amendment protection, much of the user information viewable by law
enforcement on those websites may instead fall within the consent search
framework. That is, while the violation of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy would normally require a warrant, an individual's
consent justifies the search without that warrant.69 Thus, even if the dis-
covery and use of the evidence constitutes a search, social networking
website users may have consented to law enforcement officials' viewing
their personal information.
Although the line between consensual and non-consensual searches
may be unclear, 70 the Court justifies this uncertainty because of the
"overlap" between the two considerations. In a consent search, a person
willingly gives up the right to privacy based on some action on her part,
usually by verbally agreeing to the search.7' In the social networking
context, therefore, the user's actions and acceptance of the website's pri-
vacy policy may be considered a general consent to a search. The pri-
vacy policies detailed in the following section further discuss the user's
consent to the website's use of that user's information.
B. Privacy Rules
Facebook's Statement of Rights and Responsibilities acts as the
user's guidelines to privacy protections:
You own all of the content and information you post on
Facebook, and you can control how it is shared through
your privacy and application settings. In addition:
68 See id. at 953.
69 See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. Rry. 119, 148 (2002).
70 See id.
71 See id.
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1. For content that is covered by intellectual prop-
erty rights, like photos and videos (IP content), you
specifically give us the following permission, sub-
ject to your privacy and application settings: you
grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensa-
ble, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP
content that you post on or in connection with
Facebook (IP License). This IP License ends when
you delete your IP content or your account unless
your content has been shared with others, and they
have not deleted it.72
Twitter's privacy policy governs the user's status updates:
Our Services are primarily designed to help you share
information with the world. Most of the information you
provide us is information you are asking us to make pub-
lic. This includes not only the messages you Tweet and
the metadata provided with Tweets, such as when you
Tweeted, but also the lists you create, the people you
follow, the Tweets you mark as favorites or Retweet and
many other bits of information that result from your use
of the Services. Our default is almost always to make
the information you provide public for as long as you do
not delete it from Twitter, but we generally give you set-
tings to make the information more private if you want.
Your public information is broadly and instantly dissem-
inated. For instance, your public user profile informa-
tion and public Tweets may be searchable by search
engines and are immediately delivered via SMS and our
APIs to a wide range of users and services, with one
example being the United States Library of Congress,
which archives Tweets for historical purposes. When
you share information or content like photos, videos, and
links via the Services, you should think carefully about
what you are making public. 73
Foursquare's privacy policy warns of the dangers of making infor-
mation public to friends and others:
Your "friends" can see the location and time of each of
your check-ins, first name and last initial, email, phone
number, photo, hometown, mayorships and badges, links
72 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/legall
terms (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
73 Privacy Policy, Tw7rrnR, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
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to your Twitter and Facebook accounts (if you have con-
nected those accounts to your foursquare account), a list
of your friends, Tips you write, and items on your To-Do
list. . . . Individuals reading this information may use it
or disclose it to other individuals or entities without our
control and without your knowledge. We therefore urge
you to think carefully about including any specific infor-
mation you may deem private in Shouts or To Dos or
other content (location or otherwise) that you create in
the Service. 74
C. Privacy Policies and Reasonable Expectations
In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan argued in his concurrence
that "electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place [where a person
has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy] may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment."75 This suggests that
Internet use may be afforded some Fourth Amendment protection after
all. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to draw the line between public and
private electronic information on social networking websites. As Justice
Black notes in his dissent in Katz, the Court may find it improper to
extend Fourth Amendment protection merely "to bring [the law] into har-
mony with the times." 76 The privacy policies detailed above not only
admit that much information may become public, but the websites them-
selves warn users against posting information that they may wish to keep
private. Considering the language of these policies, it is difficult to ac-
cept that users do not knowingly expose this information online and that
they maintain some expectation of privacy.
D. Recent Developments in Social Networking Use
Aside from the tags that users apply to their photographs, locations,
and status updates, Facebook and other social networking websites raise
another issue-the use of "cookies" that track the user's web use outside
of the social network. Specifically, if the user stays logged into a social
networking website, the companies can track the websites viewed by the
user and the locations from which those websites were accessed.77 Many
Facebook users keep their computer constantly logged into the website
for reasons of convenience but most of those users are unaware that
74 Privacy Policy, FoURSQUARE LABS, INC., https://foursquare.com/legal/privacy (last
visited Sept. 7, 2012).
75 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
77 Class Action Complaint, Davis v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:11-c-v-04834, at 2 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2011).
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Facebook may be tracking their web use.78 In September 2011,
Facebook admitted that "it has installed the cookies on users' computers
that track the internet [sic] activity of users even after they have logged
off of Facebook."79 Additional lawsuits were filed in Kansas over cook-
ies and tracking.80 Aside from the location tracking on computers, many
users keep their smartphones constantly logged into the Facebook web-
site.8' The Supreme Court may be reluctant to endorse GPS-tracking, 82
but these websites are able to track user locations through the social
networking website's mobile phone application.83 Thus, while the com-
puter tracking use is enough to heighten privacy concerns, users must
also consider the reasonableness of their expectation of privacy on their
mobile phones because at any time Government officials may use these
applications to track a suspect's whereabouts without probable cause or a
warrant.
While the privacy concerns are vast and complicated, there is hope
for the ordinary user. That hope comes from what may be an unlikely
place-lawmakers. Recently, United States senators John McCain and
John Kerry, with the support of the Department of Commerce, intro-
duced a bill proposing a "privacy bill of rights" for Internet users.8 4
Congress is still considering this proposal, but, in the meantime, federal
investigators continue to use social networking websites to their benefit.
For example, in recent years, Government officials have obtained war-
rants for photographs, e-mail addresses, and friends lists to determine
possible accomplices.85 They have also used GPS locations to disprove
alibis. 86
Even with the potential protection of a statute, the average social
networking website user may not actually be concerned about her pri-
vacy rights. Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg, arguably the most
78 See Emil Protalinski, Facebook Tracks You Online Even After You Log Out, ZDNirr
(Sept. 25, 2011, 7:59 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-tracks-you-online-
even-after-you-log-out/4034. But see Emil Protalinski, Facebook Denies Cookie Tracking Al-
legations, ZDNirr (Sept. 25, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-
denies-cookie-tracking-allegations/4044 (Facebook denied tracking users after users logged
out and asserted that they tracked user activity for Internet safety purposes).
79 Class Action Complaint, supra note 76 (emphasis in original).
80 See Rosanna Hegeman, Man Sues Facebook Over Privacy Issues, MSNBC.com (Oct.
6, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44809232/ns/technology and-science-se-
cuity/t/man-sues-facebook-over-pivacy-issues/#.Tx4ZDZhA594.
81 See One Billion Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
82 See discussion supra Part l.C.
83 See One Billion Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
84 See Laura Vik, Facebook and the Fourth Amendment, BILL OF Rion rs INSTITUT
BLOG (May 3, 2011), http://blog.billofrightsinstitute.org/2011/05/facebook-and-the-fourth-
amendment/.
85 See id.
86 See id.
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prominent figure in the social networking world, recently expressed the
view that Facebook users do not care about their privacy.87 After an
unforeseen privacy breach on the Facebook website, Zuckerberg re-
sponded to the problem, stating:
. . . [I]n the last 5 or 6 years, blogging has taken off in a
huge way and all these different services that have peo-
ple sharing all this information. People have really got-
ten comfortable not only sharing more information and
different kinds, but more openly and with more people.
That social norm is just something that's evolved over
time.88
Meanwhile, social networking website users may soon become
more aware of the legal ramifications of the information they post online.
Recently, Internet commentators have claimed that the use of social
networking websites may enable social media companies to give the in-
formation users provide to a third party, including law enforcement offi-
cials. 89 As a result, social networking website users may wonder
whether the Fourth Amendment protects them. This Note argues that the
answer is probably no because the police will likely not be required to
obtain a warrant to look at the publicly available information on these
websites.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
A. Ontario v. Quon: The Fourth Amendment and New Technology
In City of Ontario v. Quon,90 the Supreme Court addressed a Gov-
ernment search implicating a new technology: a pager.9 ' In Quon, the
Government employer suspected inappropriate communication on the
part of the defendant employee, and so it obtained transcripts of the de-
fendant's text messages sent using a Government-issued pager.92 The
privacy policy considered in Quon stated that "the City 'reserves the
right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and In-
ternet use, with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of
87 See Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy Is Dead on Facebook. Get Over It., MSNBC.com
(Jan. 13, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34825225/ns/technology-and-sci-
ence-techandgadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-get-over-it/#.TxxcHJhA594.
88 Id. (omission in original).
89 See generally Robert Charette, Do Facebook Users Forfeit Their 4th Amendment Pro-
tections?, IEEE SliWCrIUM (Feb. 2010), http://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/telecom/internet/
do-facebook-users-forfeit-their-4th-amendment-protections#.
90 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
91 See id. at 2624.
92 See id.
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privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." 93 As the Court
stated in Quon, the Fourth Amendment "'guarantees the privacy, dignity,
and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by of-
ficers of the Government,' without regard to whether the government
actor is investigating crime or performing another function."94 This case
raised the question of what governmental action is arbitrary. Govern-
ment officials may not look at tracking information aside from investiga-
tion into a crime,95 but does the user still maintain that privacy and
dignity in location? The issue remains open, and further application of
this principle could change because of the constant evolution of new
technology.
In Quon, the Court noted that "[c]ell phone and text message com-
munications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be
essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-
identification." 96 This is especially relevant now, with mobile phones
becoming even more easily accessible.97 Internet use on these phones
continues to alter the factors the courts must consider. The changing role
of technology and communication implies the need for a reevaluation of
policy and a continuing vigilance on the part of social networking
users.98
B. Florida v. Riley: Plain View Surveillance
In the 1989 case Florida v. Riley,99 the Supreme Court considered
the issue of police surveillance in the Fourth Amendment context.100 In
that case, a sheriff conducted surveillance from a helicopter after receiv-
ing an anonymous tip that the suspect, Riley, was growing drugs in a
greenhouse in his backyard.' 0 From an altitude of four hundred feet, the
93 Id. at 2625 (quoting Ontario's "Computer, Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy").
94 Id. at 2627 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 613-14
(1989)).
95 See Heather Kelly, Police Embrace Social Media as Crime-Fighting Tool, CNN (Aug.
30, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/tech/social-media/fighting-crime-social-
medialindex.html; see also United States v. Meregildo, No. II Cr. 576 (WPH), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115085, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) ("When a social media user disseminates his
postings and information to the public, they are not protected by the Fourth Amendment"
(citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))).
96 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
97 See ITU Releases Latest Global Technology Development Figures, INT'L
Tjt COMMC'N UNION (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press -releases/2012/
70.aspx ("Mobile-cellular subscriptions registered continuous double-digit growth in develop-
ing country markets, for a global total of six billion mobile subscriptions by end 2011.").
98 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting Justice Alito's recognition of track-
ing through social tools on mobile devices).
99 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
1oo See id. at 447-48.
101 See id. at 448.
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officer discovered the drugs without obtaining a search warrant. 10 2 Riley
argued that the search was illegal without a warrant and that any infor-
mation gained through this search of the interior of his residential backy-
ard greenhouse should have been suppressed. 03 In a 5-4 decision,
Justice White held for the Court that the action was not a search, and,
therefore, the officer was not required to obtain a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment.' 4 According to the Court, flying at such an altitude
was not contrary to any law, so any member of the public also could
have potentially flown that close to Riley's greenhouse and observed his
drug operation. 05 The Court noted, however, that if flying at that alti-
tude had been against the law, the Government's actions could have con-
stituted an illegal search. 06
Thus, this case highlighted the notion of plain view and the issue
raised in Katz of what information is knowingly exposed to the public.
Applied to social media, could photographs or locations on social
networking websites be considered plain view with no need for a war-
rant? While the social networking websites have privacy policies and
terms of use as detailed in Part III.B supra, a future Court ruling may
depend on the difference, or lack thereof, between public and private
profiles.
V. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN FRIENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS:
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND THE PRETEND FRIEND DOCTRINE
A. Informants and the Fourth Amendment
1. Hoffa v. United States: Misplaced Trust in Friends
How can ordinary human relationships and interactions color the
Fourth Amendment context? The Supreme Court addressed this question
in Hoffa v. United States. 07 In Hoffa, an informant obtained incriminat-
ing statements from mobster Jimmy Hoffa for use against him in a wit-
ness tampering prosecution. 08 The Court held that the use of an
informant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant
voluntarily gave incriminating information during an ordinary conversa-
tion.109 According to the Court, "The Fourth Amendment can certainly
be violated by guileful as well as by forcible intrusions into a constitu-
102 See id.
103 Id. at 447-48.
104 Id. at 450.
105 Id. at 451.
106 Id.
107 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
108 See id. at 294-95.
109 See id. at 303.
SOCIAL NETWORKING
tionally protected area."" 0 However, the Court held that even if the
means are deceitful, Government officials are free to start a relationship
with a suspect in the hope of receiving incriminating information.' The
Court noted that no Justice "has ever expressed the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."112
Thus, while the use of informants is deceptive, the Court held that "the
[Government's] use of secret informers is not per se unconstitutional."' '3
2. United States v. White: Misplaced Trust and Technology
The Fourth Amendment also does not protect a wrongdoer's mis-
taken belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdo-
ing will not reveal it. In United States v. White,' 14 the Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
details of his conversation with an informant wearing a recording de-
vice.' '5 The White Court found that those who choose to interact with
and invest confidence in a person assume the risk of misplacing that con-
fidence." 6 Therefore, under White, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's friends, and individuals assume the risk that such con-
versations might be recorded." 7
In dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Court's holding under-
mined the sense of security innocent people have in interacting with
others in a free society." 8 Police may use informants, but when record-
ing devices are involved, the considerations are different.' 19 Arguably,
the Court's holding allows the Government to introduce an element that
does not naturally exist in ordinary human interaction, thereby forcing
citizens to question their relationships. 2 0 Therefore, Harlan argued, the
government-issued friend is closer to the recording device used in Katz
than it is to the ordinary friendship. 121
1 10 Id. at 301.
I1I See id. at 303.
112 Id. at 302.
''3 Id. at 311.
'14 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
1is See id. at 752.
116 See id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'19 See id. at 772.
120 See id. at 787; Colb, supra note 69, at 143.
121 See Colb, supra note 69, at 143.
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B. The Pretend Friend Doctrine
Many of the recent Fourth Amendment decisions depend on the
need for reliable evidence.12 2 The Supreme Court is sometimes reluctant
to recognize more Fourth Amendment violations because such violations
lead to the suppression of valuable evidence, allowing a criminal to po-
tentially go free.123 Specifically, the Court has embraced the use of
"false friends"124 or "pretend friends" 125 to intercept information for use
as evidence.
The Supreme Court has held that Government officials are free to
act as pretend friends in an effort to gain the trust of a suspect in the
hopes of eventually hearing incriminating information to use as evidence
against that suspect.126 Pretending to be a friend and ultimately be-
traying that purported friendship is not a criminal act.127 In Katz, both
parties, Katz and his listener, reasonably believed that the conversation
was private and would not be intercepted.128 However, in White and
Hoffa, the suspect suffered no violation of privacy because one party to
the conversation was a traitor that had no expectation of privacy and
simply succeeded in obtaining incriminating evidence.129 The differing
outcomes of Katz and the various informant cases suggest that the Court
expects a certain amount of betrayal and deception in friendships, either
in the pretend friend cases or normal everyday interactions between real
friends.13 0
Social networking website users naturally have similar expectations
regarding friendship and privacy as those addressed in the pretend friend
cases. This highlights a few considerations in the use of social network-
ing websites. First, information on websites like Facebook, Twitter, and
Foursquare may be public if the user does not set the privacy settings to
display information only to those whom the user has confirmed as a
"friend," raising various consent-to-search arguments. Secondly, a user
may unknowingly confirm a pretend friend. Specifically, the user may
allow an informant to view his or her private information on the social
networking website under the assumption that the other user is a legiti-
mate, regular user who has no investigative interest in the information
posted but rather just wants to expand a social network and meet new
122 See id. at 121.
123 See id.
124 See Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media and Law Enforcement Use of
Deception as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 745, 800 (1999).
125 See Colb, supra note 69, at 139-40.
126 See, e.g, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
127 See Colb, supra note 69, at 141.
128 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Colb, supra note 69, at 141.
129 See Colb, supra note 69, at 141.
130 Id. at 141-42.
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people. Under the pretend friend line of cases, the user who becomes
friends with an informant may have no Fourth Amendment protection
because she had no reasonable expectation of privacy. On the other
hand, even one's own real friend may give the police incriminating evi-
dence. In the case of Facebook, users are in fact encouraged to report
suspicious or illegal activity.' 3' As noted above, 132 the Court has repeat-
edly ruled that there is no expectation of privacy in one's friends, so a
social networking website user similarly does not have any Fourth
Amendment protection against her friends' giving incriminating informa-
tion to Government officials. Under Katz and the pretend friend cases,
the social networking website user may receive little to no Fourth
Amendment protection for information that she knowingly exposed to
the public or information for which she has no reasonable expectation
that the friend will relay to a third party.
Upon reviewing the pretend friend line of cases, one might ask
whether White and Katz are inconsistent with each other.'33 The answer
is both yes and no. White involves first party surveillance,134 while Katz
addresses third party surveillance.' 35 The White Court believed that be-
trayal by one's friends is a reasonable expectation.136 This notion is not
without its criticism; according to Cornell Law School Professor Sherry
F. Colb, a person's expectation of privacy should not be governed by her
ability to detect pretend friends.'37 While an individual may assume a
risk in confiding in a friend, there are limitations on that assumption of
risk.138 That is, the pretend friend may only do what one might assume a
friend would do, and the confidence and expectation of privacy in one
party is crucial to the inquiry.139
VI. SOCIAL NETWORKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Youth and Social Networking
While this Note attempts to highlight the various privacy concerns
regarding social networking websites, research suggests that the social
networking generation may not see a problem with a complete loss of
privacy. For example, MTV and the Associated Press recently con-
131 See How to Report Things, FACBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/report/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2012).
132 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133 See Colb, supra note 69, at 141.
134 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971).
135 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
136 See White, 401 U.S. at 746.
137 See Colb, supra note 69, at 141.
138 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921).
139 See id.
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ducted a study regarding privacy issues relating to Facebook in which
they surveyed users of the social networking website about the impor-
tance they placed on privacy.140 In a poll of 1,355 people, fewer than
half of those polled were "very upset" about the invasion of privacy on
their social networking use.141 This study suggests that many people
may not have an expectation of privacy in the information they post on-
line. If the youth of today have already relinquished the desire for a
private life, it is difficult to expect a court to rule in favor of their
privacy.
B. Obtaining a Warrant Against a Non-Suspect
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,142 the Supreme Court held that the
Government may obtain a warrant to search for evidence even if the
owner of the place to be searched is not suspected of being involved with
the alleged criminal activity. 143 Under the Zurcher standard, the only
concern is that the evidence will in fact be in the place to be searched."
However, Zurcher addressed the First Amendment concerns in searching
a third party in a way that will compromise the First Amendment free-
dom of the press.145 This standard could conceivably be applied to pro-
tect users' freedom of speech on social networking websites, from stating
locations to discussing actions or posting pictures that could suggest that
criminal activity is occurring or will occur.
C. The Seizure of Mere Evidence
Even if the evidence on social networking websites is not the fruit
of a crime, the photographs, location check-ins, tags, and status updates
may be sufficient to justify further investigation, arrest, or eventually
conviction. In Warden v. Hayden,146 for example, the Supreme Court
found that the right to seize evidence is not based on the Government's
property interest, but rather on the Government and the public's interest
in investigating and solving crime.147 That interest allows for the seizure
of "mere evidence," which is evidence that is not itself the fruit of a
crime, but rather provides clues or direction in the commission of a
140 See Kashmir Hill, Really? Half of Young People Not That Upset By Hacking of Their
Facebook and E-mail Accounts, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2011/10/12/really-half-of-young-people-not-that-upset-by-hacking-of-their-
facebook-and-e-mail-accounts/.
141 Id.
142 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
143 Id. at 567-68.
144 See id. at 554.
145 See id. at 563.
146 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
I47 See id. at 304, 306.
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crime. 14 8 Under the mere evidence standard, the Government is free to
obtain all evidence of a crime. 14 9 In the context of social networking, the
Government may search websites like Facebook, Twitter, and Four-
square in the hopes of learning more about the suspect's whereabouts or
actions. However, this also means that the Internet user who may not be
the primary suspect may also be subject to search. Government officials
may thus seize this evidence under the Zurcher principle that one may be
searched even if the officials have no reason to suspect the third party of
committing the illegal act or assisting the suspect.
D. Standing and Fourth Amendment Suppression Claims
In all Fourth Amendment cases, only the person with "standing,"
i.e., the person with the reasonable expectation of privacy, may argue for
the suppression of illegally obtained evidence. In the social networking
context, who has the expectation of privacy-the user or the social
networking website? If the Government searched social networking
websites for your information, could you even present a claim to sup-
press that evidence?
Under Rakas v. Illinois,150 the Supreme Court's decision articulat-
ing Fourth Amendment standing, an individual has standing to argue for
the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence if she had a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the place where the evidence was
seized.15' As in Katz, the person challenging the lawfulness of the
search must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place that the
search occurred.15 2 The person must also demonstrate that the expecta-
tion of privacy is one that society accepts as reasonable. 5 3
Therefore, a social networking website user may argue that she has
an expectation of privacy in the information shared online, but it is also
arguable that the social networking website holds the privacy interest.
This is because the terms of use of these websites give the websites the
rights to information posted online, and the social networking websites
control any information searched by the Government on those web-
sites. 15 4 Thus, while social networking website users may want their in-
formation to remain private, they may not have the right to raise a claim
if that information becomes publicly available or illegally searched by
Government officials.
148 See id. at 300-01, 310.
149 See id.; see also Fo. R. CRIM. P. 41(c) (stating that a warrant may be issued to search
for and seize all evidence of a crime).
150 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
151 Id. at 135.
152 See id. at 149.
153 See id.
154 See supra Part Il.B.
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CONCLUSION
As social networking websites become more popular, the legal im-
plications concerning those websites increase. While the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme
Court will not afford protection to anything it does not consider to be a
search. Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare all provide great opportuni-
ties to connect with friends and create new relationships,' 55 but these
opportunities may come at a price. The ordinary Internet user must con-
sider the legal significance of posting private information to a public net-
work. The 800 million Facebook users, 100 million Twitter users, and
10 million Foursquare users must stay constantly aware of the legality of
their actions, especially if they write about those actions online or post
photographs on public Internet websites. Additionally, while the Su-
preme Court may not endorse GPS-tracking,15 6 Internet users may volun-
tarily opt-in to having their location tracked, whether that occurs through
check-ins or the cookies placed on computers or smartphones.
Courts judge Fourth Amendment search claims by the Katz reasona-
ble expectation of privacy standard, and this Note argues that social
networking users cannot expect to maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy when they sign away their rights in privacy policies or post infor-
mation for public consumption through their friends or any Internet
viewers. The Fourth Amendment case law that has followed the Katz
decision continues to use this framework, and many citizens have relin-
quished their privacy rights through public disclosure of information.
America may or may not be in the post-privacy era that Mark Zuck-
erberg describes.1 5 7 It is true that youth do not value privacy as much as
their elders, but their feelings may change when they realize that their
entire lives can be traced on the Internet. Lawmakers are becoming more
aware of the legal significance of social networking, and recent develop-
ments in Internet privacy laws are a step in the right direction. However,
the only sure protection is awareness of the information one posts online
and the image thus projected to Government officials. In the immortal
words of Adele, they will "find someone like you." 58
155 See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
156 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012).
157 See Popkin, supra note 87.
158 ADEE, SOMEONE Lim- You (Columbia 2011).
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